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United States v. AT&T, Inc.: Mega-Merger or MegaMonopoly?

K ENDALL N. KUNTZ *©

I. Introduction

In United States v. AT&T, Inc.,1 the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit addressed whether the proposed merger between AT&T Inc.
(“AT&T”) and Time Warner Inc. (“Time Warner”)2 violated antitrust laws.3 The
proposed merger would combine the video programming distribution services of
AT&T with the content creation and programming services of Time Warner, thereby
condensing all three stages of production for the video programming and
distribution industry into the single, merged company.4 Ultimately, the D.C. Circuit
Court held that the merger did not have anticompetitive effects and denied a
permanent injunction for the merger. 5 The court correctly found that the merger
would not substantially reduce industry competition because (1) behavioral
remedies imposed on the merger, such as irrevocable arbitration agreements,
would curb a tendency towards anticompetitive actions,6 and (2) the merger would

© Kendall N. Kuntz, , 2021.
* J.D. Candidate, 2022, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law. The author would like
to thank the editors and staff on the Journal of Business & Technology Law for their feedback and support
throughout the writing process. The author would also like to thank her family and friends for their love and
support, without which this paper would not be possible.
1. 916 F.3d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
2. Time Warner changed its name to WarnerMedia in 2018 following the district court’s approval of
AT&T’s acquisition of Time Warner. Katharine Schwab, Time Warner is Now WarnerMedia, FAST CO. (June 15,
2018), https://www.fastcompany.com/40586059/time-warner-is-now-warnermedia.
3. AT&T, 916 F.3d at 1031.
4. Id. at 1033, 1035.
5. Id. at 1047. Following completion of this Note, in May 2021, AT&T announced that it would unwind its
acquisition of WarnerMedia to combine WarnerMedia with Discovery in a deal for $43 billion. Steve Kovach &
Sam Meredith, AT&T Announces $43 Billion Deal to Merge WarnerMedia with Discovery, CNBC (May 17, 2021,
4:03 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2021/05/17/att-to-combine-warnermedia-and-discovery-assets-to-createa-new-standalone-company.html.
6. See infra Section IV.A. Behavioral remedies “seek to address the identified competition concerns by
requiring certain conduct from the undertakings concerned,” which can include a requirement to refrain from
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prevent the individual elimination of either AT&T or Time Warner from an
increasingly competitive, innovative market.7 The final decision of the court to
allow the merger has since led to price increases for the merged entity’s customers,
an increase in the number of vertical mergers and acquisitions in the United States,
and new merger guidelines to govern future vertical mergers.8
This Note begins by introducing the factual background of United States v. AT&T,
Inc. and the video programming and distribution industry.9 Next, it outlines the
governing antitrust law and various courts’ treatment of vertical mergers. 10
Subsequently, it details the D.C. Circuit Court’s reasoning in United States v. AT&T,
Inc.11 Then, it analyzes the D.C. Circuit Court’s holding and the impact of the holding
on consumers and future mergers and acquisitions.12 Finally, this Note concludes
by addressing recent Big Tech antitrust lawsuits and the impact of United States v.
AT&T, Inc. on pending cases.13
II. Factual Background

A. The Case
On October 22, 2016, AT&T announced a proposed merger with Time Warner. 14
AT&T was a distribution company with two multichannel video programming
distributor (“MVPD”) products: DirecTV and U-verse.15 Time Warner was a content
creator and programmer with three units, including Home Box Office Programming
(“HBO”), Warner Bros., and Turner Broadcasting.16 Including debt, the transaction
was valued at nearly $108 billion.17 Following the announcement of the proposed

certain actions. Frank Maier-Rigaud & Benjamin Loertscher, Structural vs. Behavioral Remedies, COMPETITION
POL’Y INT’L (Apr. 20, 2020), at 3.
7. See infra Section IV.B.
8. See infra Section IV.C.
9. See infra Section I.
10. See infra Section II.
11. See infra Section III.
12. See infra Sections IV.A–IV.C.
13. See infra Section IV.C.4.
14. United States v. AT&T, Inc., 916 F.3d 1029, 1031 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
15. Id. at 1035.
16. Id.
17. United States v. AT&T Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 161, 181 (D.D.C. 2018), aff’d 916 F.3d 1029, 1031–32 (D.C.
Cir. 2019). The deal was valued at $85 billion not including debt. Tiernan Ray, AT&T to Buy Time Warner for
$107.5/Sh in Cash and Stock; $85 Equity Value, BARRON’S (Oct. 22, 2016, 8:41 PM),
https://www.barrons.com/articles/at-t-to-buy-time-warner-for-107-5-sh-in-cash-and-stock-85-equity-value1477183327.
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merger, the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division conducted an investigation
of the proposed merger and its competitive effects.18
The United States sued to stop the merger, relying on Section 7 of the Clayton
Act.19 At trial, evidence displayed that AT&T and Time Warner sought the merger
as a response to evolving industry dynamics, including “the increasing importance
of web- and mobile-based content offerings; the explosion in targeted, digital
advertising; and the limitations attendant with AT&T and Time Warner’s respective
business models.”20 The government conceded to the trial court that an immediate
benefit to the vertical integration was a cost savings to then-current AT&T
subscribers of about $350 million annually for video distribution services.21
However, the government also alleged that the merger would “substantially lessen
competition in the video programming and distribution market nationwide.” 22 To
support this allegation, the government advanced three antitrust violation theories:
(1) that under an increased leverage theory, the merger would enable Turner
Broadcasting to charge AT&T rival distributors and consumers higher prices for its
content; (2) that the merger would “substantially lessen competition” by hindering
the rise of lower-cost, virtual MVPDs that threatened the traditional pay-TV model;
and (3) that the merged entity could “harm competition by preventing AT&T’s rival
distributors from using HBO as a promotional tool to attract and retain
customers.”23
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia denied the
government’s request to enjoin the vertical merger. 24 The district court found that
the government could not show that the proposed merger was “likely to increase
Turner [Broadcasting]’s bargaining leverage in affiliate negotiations.” 25
Additionally, the district court found more “probative” real-world evidence was
offered by AT&T than by the government, including real-world data from prior
vertical mergers in the industry that demonstrated a decrease in content prices.26
Finally, the district court found that the opinion of the government’s expert witness,
Professor Carl Shapiro, was not sufficiently supported by real-world evidence and

18.

AT&T, 310 F. Supp. 3d at 183.
AT&T, 916 F.3d at 1031. The Government also sought to permanently enjoin any other agreement,
plan, or understanding that would allow AT&T to gain control over Time Warner or its assets. AT&T, 310 F.
Supp. 3d at 184. Section 7 of the Clayton Act is codified in 15 U.S.C. § 18. 15 U.S.C. § 18.
20. AT&T, 310 F. Supp. 3d at 181.
21. Id. at 182.
22. Id. at 164.
23. Id. at 194. The increased leverage theory suggested that the costs for Turner Broadcasting’s content
would increase post-merger, and that the increased prices would be passed off to consumers. AT&T, 916 F.3d
at 1031.
24. AT&T, 916 F.3d at 1031.
25. Id. at 1037 (citing AT&T, 310 F. Supp. 3d at 199).
26. Id. at 1038.
19.
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that his quantitative model, which estimated that the merger would increase
consumer prices in the future, lacked sufficient reliability and factual credibility. 27
The government appealed the district court’s rejection of a permanent
injunction and challenged only the district court’s holding on the government’s
increased leverage theory.28 On appeal, the government argued that the district
court “(1) misapplied economic principles, (2) used internally inconsistent logic
when evaluating industry evidence, and (3) clearly erred in rejecting Professor
Shapiro’s quantitative model.”29
B. Horizontal Mergers Versus Vertical Mergers
Two types of mergers are relevant to antitrust law: horizontal mergers and
vertical mergers. A horizontal merger results when two companies that operate in
the same or similar industry merge together to create a common ownership and
control.30 A horizontal merger of two or more companies can enhance the merged
entity’s market power by eliminating market competition. 31 Conversely, a vertical
merger is a merger between two companies within the same supply chain that
operate at different stages in the production process.32 Vertical mergers occur to
create: (1) operating synergies by improving supply chain coordination; (2) financial
synergies by reducing capital costs and realizing higher profits; and (3) managerial
synergies.33 There are many benefits of vertical mergers, including the elimination
of double-marginalization (“EDM”), decreased pressure on pricing, and an inherent
“likelihood of improving competition [more] than horizontal mergers.”34
Vertical mergers create the potential for several anticompetitive effects. 35 First,
a vertical merger may create an entity that is powerful enough to dominate one or

27.

Id.
Id. at 1031.
29. Id. at 1038.
30. Horizontal mergers can occur to utilize economies of scale and scope and increase diversification.
What is a Horizontal Merger?, CORP. FIN. INST.,
https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/knowledge/strategy/horizontal-merger/ (last visited Oct.
28, 2020).
31. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (2010).
32. What is a Vertical Merger?, CORP. FIN. INST.,
https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/knowledge/strategy/vertical-merger-integration/ (last
visited Sept. 20, 2020).
33. Id.
34. D. Bruce Hoffman, Acting Dir., Bureau of Competition, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Vertical Merger
Enforcement at the FTC, Remarks Before the Credit Suisse 2018 Washington Perspectives Conference 3 (Jan.
10,
2018),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1304213/hoffman_vertical_merger_speech
_final.pdf.
35. Lawrence P. Postol, Evaluating Vertical Mergers under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 371,
377 (1979).
28.
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both of the merged firms’ singular markets.36 Secondly, if the merged firms elect
to purchase and sell their products between each other exclusively, a part of the
capacity of the acquired firm and of the acquiring firm may be foreclosed from the
relevant market.37 Lastly, vertical mergers may increase barriers to entry or trigger
more vertical mergers.38 However, vertical mergers often face less scrutiny than
horizontal mergers, as although they have the potential to pose a threat to
competition, they are not inherently anticompetitive, unlike horizontal mergers. 39
C. Anticompetitive Merger Remedies
The Antitrust Division of the United States Department of Justice (“Antitrust
Division”) is responsible for enforcing antitrust laws.40 The Antitrust Division may
impose various remedies on a merger if the Antitrust Division finds that the merger
would violate § 7 of the Clayton Act and that the resulting harm justifies remedial
action.41 Remedies must: (1) preserve competition, not protect competitors; (2)
not create ongoing government market regulation; and (3) be enforceable. 42
The Antitrust Division may seek an injunction to prevent the merger from being
consummated.43 Or, the parties involved in the transaction may seek to avoid
litigation by instead offering to “cure the [Antitrust] Division’s concerns.”44 In this
scenario, the Antitrust Division could choose to agree to a settlement that allows
the merger to proceed with modifications that prevent anticompetitive effects. 45
Modifications can come in the form of structural or behavioral remedies. 46 A
structural remedy generally involves the sale of businesses or assets by the merging
firms.47 A behavioral remedy typically involves injunctive provisions that regulate
and restrain the merged entity’s post-merger business conduct or pricing
authority.48 Behavioral remedies “may restrain potentially procompetitive
behavior, prevent a firm from responding efficiently to changing market conditions,

36.

Id.
Id.
38. Id.
39. Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Competitive Harm from Vertical Mergers, FAC. SCHOLARSHIP AT PENN L. (Oct. 24,
2020), at 5; see also Postol, supra note 35, at 377.
40. 15 U.S.C. § 25; U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., MERGER REMEDIES MANUAL (2020).
41. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 40.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Behavioral remedies, also referred to as conduct remedies, are often difficult to make and enforce, and
thus are inappropriate except in narrow circumstances. Id.
37.
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and require the merged firm to ignore the profit-maximizing incentives inherent in
its integrated structure.”49
D. The Video Programming and Distribution Industry
The video programming and distribution industry that AT&T and Time Warner
participated in has three stages of production. 50 In stage one, studios or networks
create content.51 In stage two, programmers package the content into networks
and license the networks to distributors.52 In stage three, the distributors sell
bundles of networks to subscribers.53 Looking more closely at stage two,
programmers license content to distributors via affiliate agreements, and
distributors pay affiliate fees to programmers.54 During this affiliate negotiation
process, if an agreement cannot be reached, there may be a “blackout” where the
distributor loses the ability to share content from the programmer with its
customers.55 Generally, if there is a blackout, the programmer risks losing affiliate
fee revenues and the distributor risks losing subscribers. 56 However, the risks and
corresponding costs are so high that blackouts are rare, even though they are often
used as a threat during negotiations.57
The video programming and distribution industry has been evolving recently in
tandem with technological advancements.58 One advancement has been seen in
the MVPD realm. Traditionally for MVPDs, channels were distributed to subscribers
over cable or satellite, similar to how DirecTV or U-verse distributed channels.59
However, virtual MVPDs, such as YouTube TV, have been gaining market share and
distribute live and on demand videos to subscribers via the internet, which is lowcost and easy to use.60 In addition, subscription video on demand services
(“SVODs”) have also grown competitive in the industry. 61 SVODs, like Netflix, do
not offer live content, but maintain a library of content that viewers can access on

49.
50.
51.

Id.
United States v. AT&T, Inc., 916 F.3d 1029, 1033 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
For example, in stage one, a studio could create a television show and sell it to Turner Broadcasting.

Id.
52. In stage two, Turner Broadcasting, a programmer, could package the content into a network, such as
CNN, and license the network to its distributors, including DirecTV. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1034.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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demand, and are gaining market share with their low-cost subscription plans.62
Many leading SVODs are vertically integrated, allowing them to both create and
distribute content to consumers.63
III. Legal Background

Antitrust law dates back to the late 1800s, and currently consists of three core
federal antitrust laws: the Sherman Act, the Federal Trade Commission Act, and the
Clayton Act.64 The three antitrust laws share the same objective: “to protect the
process of competition for the benefit of consumers, making sure there are strong
incentives for businesses to operate efficiently, keep prices down, and keep quality
up.”65 Section II.A introduces Section 7 of the Clayton Act. 66 Section II.B describes
amendments to the Clayton Act.67 Lastly, Section II.C discusses the treatment of
vertical mergers by various courts.68
A. Section 7 of the Clayton Act
The Clayton Act was originally passed in 1914 to address the limitations of the
scope of the Sherman Act, which had failed to constrain the number of
anticompetitive trusts and monopolies.69 Section 7 of the Clayton Act stated that:
“No person engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce shall
acquire . . . the whole or any part of the stock or other share of capital and . . . the
whole or any part of the assets of another person engaged also in commerce or in
any activity affecting commerce, where in any line of commerce or in any activity
affecting commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may
be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.”70
62.

Id.
Id.
64. The Antitrust Laws, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guideantitrust-laws/antitrust-laws (last visited Dec. 18, 2020) (the Sherman Act is codified in 15 U.S.C. § 1–7, the
Federal Trade Commission Act is codified in 15 U.S.C. § 41–58, and the Clayton Act is codified in 15 U.S.C. § 12–
27). The Sherman Act was passed as a “comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free
and unfettered competition as the rule of trade.” Id. The Federal Trade Commission Act established the Federal
Trade Commission (“FTC”). Id.
65. Id.
66. See infra Section II.A.
67. See infra Section II.B.
68. See infra Section II.C.
69. Scott A. Sher, Closed but Not Forgotten: Government Review of Consummated Mergers Under Section
7 of the Clayton Act, 45 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 41, 47 (2004). The Sherman Act declared that any contract, trust, or
conspiracy that restrained trade or commerce was illegal, but the Supreme Court limited the scope of the
Sherman Act in early decisions and often ruled against the government, who had sought to restrict early
monopolistic mergers. Id. at 45.
70. 15 U.S.C. § 18.
63.
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Section 7 applied a stringent standard, prohibiting mergers with probable anticompetitive effects, rather than requiring proof of certain harm.71 To prevent a
merger under Section 7, the government had to show that the effect of the
proposed merger “may be substantially to lessen competition.” 72 For example, to
enjoin a merger on the basis of anti-competitive effects, the government would not
have to precisely quantify the size of an alleged price increase, but rather, the
government would only need to prove that the price would increase due to the
merger.73
B. Amendments to Section 7 of the Clayton Act
Section 7 of the Clayton Act has been amended to expand its scope and notice
requirements. In 1950, the Celler-Kefauver Act was passed as an amendment to
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, which had an original scope of only horizontal
mergers.74 The Celler-Kefauver Act enabled the Clayton Act to additionally cover
vertical mergers.75 In 1976, the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act
(“HSR Act”) was passed as another amendment to Section 7.76 The HSR Act required
companies planning mergers or acquisitions to notify the government of merger or
acquisition plans in advance.77 The purpose of the HSR Act was to “improve and
facilitate the expeditious and effective enforcement of the antitrust laws.”78
C. Treatment of Vertical Mergers by Courts
Since 1950, the United States Supreme Court has only decided three vertical
merger cases under Section 7 of the Clayton Act. 79 In 1957, the Court upset the
general assumption that Section 7 did not apply to vertical mergers.80 In United
States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.,81 the Court referenced the 1950 CellerKefauver Act to evidence the congressional intent that Section 7 apply to all types

71. United States v. AT&T, Inc., 916 F.3d 1029, 1031 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (citing Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,
370 U.S. 294, 294, 323 (1962)).
72. Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 323.
73. Hovenkamp, supra note 39, at 13–14.
74. Celler-Kefauver Act, Pub. L. No. 81-899, 64 Stat. 1125, 1125–26 (1950).
75. Id.
76. The Antitrust Laws, supra note 64.
77. Id.
78. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383 (1976)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1311).
79. See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957); Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962); Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562 (1972).
80. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. at 590, 592. Prior to this case, the Federal Trade Commission
said that Section 7 did not apply to vertical acquisitions. Id. at 590.
81. 353 U.S. 586.
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of mergers, whether vertical, horizontal, or conglomerate. 82 The Court concluded
that du Pont’s acquisition of 23% of General Motor’s stock foreclosed sales to
General Motors by other suppliers, thereby creating illegal, anticompetitive
effects.83
The Court continued to expand on its vertical merger rulings by identifying
additional factors to consider in determining whether a merger was
anticompetitive. When the leading vertical antitrust case, Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States,84 came before the Court in 1962, the Court was tasked to determine
whether a merger of two shoe companies violated Section 7 of the Clayton Act by
foreclosing competition of the acquired company’s retail market while enhancing
the acquiring company’s competitive advantage over other producers, distributors,
and sellers of shoes.85 With regards to the vertical aspects of the merger, the Court
stated that the market share percentage foreclosed by the merger alone was not
decisive; additional economic and historical factors also had to be considered to
determine if the merger was one that Congress sought to prevent through the
Clayton Act legislation.86 The most important additional factor was “the very nature
and purpose of the arrangement.”87 Notably, the Court indicated that it must look
to the probable effect of the merger in the present as well as in the future to
determine if there was a Clayton Act violation.88 In Brown Shoe Co., it was clear that
Brown Shoe Co. (“Brown”), the fourth largest manufacturer in the shoe industry,
was trying to acquire ownership of G.R. Kinney Company, Inc. (“Kinney”) to force
Brown’s shoes into Kinney’s stores.89 The Court ultimately held that this vertical
merger would substantially lessen competition if left unchecked, given the trend in
the shoe industry toward vertical mergers and Brown’s historic policy of forcing its
shoes on its retail subsidiaries, thereby foreclosing competition from current and
future market share.90
As vertical merger jurisprudence grew, the Court tackled a growing area of
concern—the balance between the costs and benefits of mergers. In the year
following Brown Shoe Co., the Court in United States v. Philadelphia National Bank91
stated, “[w]e are clear, however, that a merger the effect of which ‘may be
substantially to lessen competition’ is not saved because, on some ultimate

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 590.
Id. at 592, 602, 606–07.
370 U.S. 294 (1962).
Id. at 296–97.
Id. at 329.
Id.
Id. at 333.
Id. at 332.
Id. at 334.
374 U.S. 321 (1963).
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reckoning of social or economic debits and credits, it may be deemed beneficial.”92
The Court continued by noting that while a choice between the benefits of the
merger and its anticompetitive effects was beyond the ordinary judicial question,
Congress, via its own legislation in Section 7 of the Clayton Act, made the choice:
prioritizing preserving market competition.93 “Congress determined to preserve
our traditionally competitive economy. It therefore proscribed anticompetitive
mergers, the benign and the malignant alike, fully aware, we must assume, that
some price might have to be paid.”94
In the only other vertical merger case decided by the Supreme Court, the Court
examined the unique dichotomy of a vertical merger between two entities which
each dominated their respective markets. In Ford Motor Co. v. United States,95 Ford
Motor Co. (“Ford”), which accounted for 90% of automobile production in the
United States, sought to acquire the assets of Electric Autolite Co., which was only
one of two independent players left in the replacement market. 96 The Court held
that the acquisition of Electric Autolite Co. violated Section 7 because it would
substantially lessen competition for two reasons: (1) prior to the acquisition, Ford
already had a “pervasive impact on the aftermarket,” potentially deterring current
competitors; and (2) it raised barriers to entry in the market and reduced the
chances of future de-concentration in the market.97 When Ford acquired the assets,
the only independent player left in the replacement market was Champion, whose
market share declined from 50% to 33% following the anticompetitive acquisition. 98
The Department of Justice historically won vertical merger cases it tried under
the Clayton Act, and prior to 2018, the last time that the Department of Justice lost
a vertical merger case was in 1977.99 In United States v. Hammermill Paper Co.,100
a Pennsylvania District Court found that the Hammerhill Paper Co. (“Hammerhill”)
did not violate Section 7 when it acquired the assets and stock of two paper
merchants, based on historically low industry barriers to entry, corporate practices,
and previous mergers.101 The court found that the vertical merger was lawful
because entry barriers in the paper merchant business were historically low, so it
was improbable that the merger would foreclose access of manufacturers to
distribution through paper merchants.102 If Hammerhill tried to foreclose access of
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

122

Id. at 371.
Id.
Id.
405 U.S. 562 (1972).
Id. at 565–66.
Id. at 567–68.
Id. at 566.
See United States v. Hammerhill Paper Co., 429 F. Supp. 1271, 1294 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
Id.
Id. at 1294.
Id. at 1285–86, 1293.
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competitors, the foreclosed could establish new firms or branches.103 The court
also found that competition would not be impacted, because irrespective of the
merger, Hammerhill historically had a policy of distributing through a wide variety
of paper merchants, not just through one singular merchant. 104 Lastly, because
previous mergers in the industry did not approach “monopolistic proportions,” the
court found that this merger would not reach monopoly status and lessen industry
competition.105
Notably, a merger in the video distribution industry was greenlit in 2011 after
being challenged by the Department of Justice and several states. In 2011, the
United States and the States of California, Florida, Missouri, Texas, and Washington
sought to permanently enjoin the merger of Comcast Corporation (“Comcast”) and
NBC Universal, Inc. (“NBCU”), contending that the proposed merger would reduce
competition by allowing Comcast to obtain majority control of the video
distribution market.106 The vertical merger was allowed to proceed forward as of
February 20, 2011, with certain remedies proscribed by the Government on the
merger, to prevent “anti-competitive behavior.”107 The remedies that the
Government ultimately agreed to included an arbitration mechanism to prevent
blackouts during arbitration, mitigating concerns that the merger would withhold
NBCU programming from other distributors to benefit Comcast’s distribution
subscriptions.108
IV. The Court’s Reasoning

When United States v. AT&T, Inc. reached the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit, the court was tasked with determining whether the
district court erred in holding that the government did not meet its burden of
showing that the merger between AT&T and Time Warner was likely to increase
Turner Broadcasting’s bargaining leverage. 109 In examining the government’s
appeal on the increased leverage theory, the circuit court reviewed the district
court’s application of two economic principles: (1) the Nash bargaining theory and
(2) corporate-wide profit maximization.110 Additionally, the circuit court assessed

103.

Id.
Id. at 1293.
105. Id. at 1293–94.
106. United States v. Comcast Corp., 808 F. Supp. 2d 145, 146–47. (D.D.C. 2011).
107. Id. at 147.
108. Id. at 148; George S. Ford, A Retrospective Analysis of Vertical Mergers in Multichannel Video
Programming Distribution Markets: The Comcast-NBCU Merger, PHX. CTR. FOR ADVANCED LEGAL & ECON. PUB. POL’Y
STUD.: PHX. CTR. POL’Y BULL. 2-4 (Dec. 2017), https://www.justice.gov/atr/page/file/1046221/download.
109. United States v. AT&T, Inc., 916 F.3d 1029, 1033 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
110. Id. at 1038–39.
104.
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the district court’s decision to reject the governmental expert witness’ bargaining
model at trial.111
A. The Nash Bargaining Theory
The government alleged in the district court that under the Nash bargaining
theory, an economic theory of bargaining, Turner Broadcasting’s bargaining
position in affiliate negotiations would increase after the merger, because its
relationship with AT&T would lower its blackout costs.112 With lower blackout costs
and greater negotiation leverage, the government alleged Turner Broadcasting
could increase the cost of its content for distributors and consumers.113 The Nash
bargaining “theory posits that . . . when a party would have a greater loss from
failing to reach an agreement, the other party has increased bargaining leverage”
and “is more likely to achieve a favorable price in the negotiation.”114 In the district
court, the government heavily relied on statements made by AT&T and DirecTV
executives during an earlier FCC regulatory review, that a vertical integration could
give distributors an incentive to charge higher affiliate fees. 115 However, AT&T’s
expert conducted an econometric analysis using real-world data, demonstrating
that content pricing in prior vertical mergers had not increased like the Nash
bargaining theory had predicted.116 In light of this reliable, real-world evidence, the
district court rejected the Nash bargaining theory.117
The circuit court made two findings on the topic of the Nash bargaining theory.
First, it held that the district court was correct in concluding that the Nash
bargaining theory inaccurately predicted a post-merger increase in content costs
during affiliate negotiations.118 The circuit court relied on evidence of similar
mergers in a dynamic market that did not result in a “statistically significant increase
in content costs.”119 Relatedly, the circuit court agreed that the district court was
correct to find that Turner Broadcasting’s bargaining leverage would not increase
enough to charge higher prices for content.120 The circuit court reasoned that
because blackouts were expensive, real-world evidence did not show that Turner

111. Id. at 1045–46. The circuit court also evaluated the government’s argument that the district court
reasoned inconsistently when evaluating trial testimony, but this Note will not cover that argument. Id. at 1045.
112. Id. at 1035–36.
113. Id. at 1040.
114. Id. at 1039.
115. Id.
116. One CEO testified that the video programming and distribution industry had become so dynamic that
there was a “null effect of vertical integration on affiliate negotiations.” Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1040.
119. Id.
120. Id.
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Broadcasting would or could drive up prices by threatening long-term blackouts for
distributors.121
Additionally, the circuit court emphasized Turner Broadcasting’s irrevocable
offer of arbitration agreements with a no-blackout guarantee.122 The “baseball
style” arbitration agreements, a self-imposed conduct remedy on the merger, were
a means of addressing the government’s concern that Turner Broadcasting would
be incentivized to increase prices and enter a blackout during affiliate
negotiations.123 In a “baseball style” arbitration agreement, each party would make
a final offer, and the arbitrator would then decide which offer to select; the
distributor would have the right to continue to carry Turner Broadcasting networks
pending an arbitration decision.124 The circuit court referenced the Comcast-NBCU
merger, a similar vertical merger, where the government recognized that
“‘especially in vertical mergers, . . . conduct remedies’ . . . ‘can be a very useful tool
to address the competitive problems while preserving competition and allowing
efficiencies’ that ‘may result from the transaction.’”125
The combination of blackout costs, the lack of statistically significant evidence
supporting the allegation that consumer prices would increase from such a merger,
and the arbitration agreements led the circuit court to affirm the decision of the
district court, holding that Turner Broadcasting’s bargaining leverage would not
increase from the merger.126
B. Corporate-Wide Profit Maximization
On appeal, the government also argued that the district court misunderstood
and failed to apply the principle of corporate-wide profit maximization.127
Corporate-wide profit maximization “posits that a business with multiple divisions
will seek to maximize its total profits” and is a principle of antitrust law.128 The
government argued that the district court misapplied this principle because the
district court found that evidence suggested that vertically integrated companies
historically had decided that corporate profit maximization was best accomplished
121. Such evidence included testimonies from an AT&T Executive, the President of Turner Broadcasting,
and the CEO of Time Warner. Id. at 1040–41.
122. Id. at 1041. Turner Broadcasting offered nearly 1,000 distributors arbitration agreements, enabling the
distributors to engage in “baseball style” arbitration for seven years with Turner Broadcasting. Id. at 1035.
123. Id. at 1041.
124. Id. at 1035.
125. Id. at 1041 (citing United States v. AT&T Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 161, 169 (D.D.C. 2018), aff’d 916 F.3d
1029, 1031–32 (D.C. Cir. 2019)).
126. Id. at 1042–43.
127. Id. at 1043.
128. Id.; see also Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771 (1984) (noting that a parent and
its subsidiary must be viewed as a single enterprise for Sherman Act purposes, must have a complete unity of
interest, common objectives, and will act for the benefit of each other with a single “corporate consciousness”).
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by programming and distribution components separately maximizing their
respective revenues, which was contrary to this profit maximization theory. 129
However, the district court was just noting that this theory was not inconsistent
with testimony that the identity of the programmer’s owner did not affect affiliate
negotiations because it would be in Turner Broadcasting’s best interest to spread
its content among distributors and to not impose blackouts to maximize the merged
firm’s profits.130 The circuit court agreed with the district court, holding that during
negotiations, it was in the best interest of the merged entity to license programing
broadly to other distributors to maximize profit because withholding content would
lead distributors to seek out other programmers for content, hindering corporate
profit maximization for the merged entity of AT&T and Time Warner. 131
The district court, circuit court, and government also agreed that there would be
cost savings from the merger by eliminating double-marginalization (“EDM”).132
Pre-merger, Turner Broadcasting earned a profit margin when licensing content to
AT&T, and AT&T earned a profit margin from selling content to customers.133 Postmerger, Turner Broadcasting would no longer earn the profit margin from licensing
content to AT&T, and that cost savings could be passed to consumers to attract
more subscribers.134 The circuit court found that Turner Broadcasting licensing its
programming to AT&T at a lower cost post-merger aligned with the corporate-wide
profit maximization theory, because the merged firm would be maximizing its
unified profit at the expense of Turner Broadcasting maximizing its individual
revenue.135
C. Errors in the Government Expert’s Quantitative Bargaining Model
The circuit court also ruled against the government and found that the district
court did not err in rejecting the government expert’s quantitative bargaining
model.136 The government’s expert, Professor Carl Shapiro, presented a model to
the district court that predicted an annual net increase of $286 million in costs

129.

AT&T, 916 F.3d at 1043.
Id. The Chair of Content Distribution at NBC Universal previously had testified that at Comcast-NBCU,
he “never once took into account the interest of Comcast cable in trying to negotiate a carriage agreement for
NBC Universal.” Id. (citation omitted).
131. Id. at 1044.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. The profit margin would be eliminated for Turner Broadcasting because it would be licensing its
content to AT&T post-merger at a lower cost than pre-merger. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1045–46.
130.
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passed onto consumers in 2016, which would increase in future years. 137 The
district court found that the evidence was insufficient to estimate annual costs for
rival distributors.138 The circuit court found additional issues with the model,
including that the model did not take into account long-term contracts which
restricted Turner Broadcasting’s ability to raise content prices for distributors at
least until 2021, so the model was distorted and the price increases were
overestimated.139 The circuit court’s decision to reject the model was further
supported by the model’s failure to consider the post-litigation offer of arbitration
agreements, which prohibited certain blackouts and price increases. 140
V. Analysis and Impact

In United States v. AT&T, Inc., the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit held that the merger between AT&T and Time Warner was not
an antitrust violation under Section 7 of the Clayton Act because the merged entity
would not have increased leverage to lessen industry competition. 141 The court
held correctly that the merger would not significantly lessen industry competition
because the merged entity was constrained in its future actions by behavioral
remedies.142 In addition, following the court’s declaration that this respective
industry was evolving with new market players, the merger may actually increase
long-term market competition by enabling AT&T and Time Warner to leverage each
other’s capabilities and avoid individually being eliminated from the market. 143
Finally, while the merger did not lessen industry competition, the merger greatly
impacted AT&T and Time Warner customers and prices, overall vertical mergers
and acquisitions, and guidelines on vertical mergers, which were updated for the
first time in decades after United States v. AT&T, Inc. was decided.144

137. Professor Shapiro calculated the $286 million net cost increase from a $587 million increase in annual
fees for rival distributors to license Turner Broadcasting content minus the cost savings of $352 million for AT&T
from the merger. Id. at 1046.
138. Id.
139. Id. The circuit court also noted that vertical mergers can create harms beyond just higher prices for
consumers, including decreased product quality and reduced innovation, so quantitative evidence of a price
increase was not required to prevail on a Section 7 challenge; however, the government did not argue any nonprice related harms and instead only argued harm on the consumer price. Id. at 1045–46.
140. Id. at 1046.
141. Id. at 1031–32.
142. See infra Section IV.A.
143. See infra Section IV.B.
144. See infra Section IV.C.
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A. The Court Correctly Held that the Merger Would Not Have Anticompetitive
Effects Because the Merged Entity was Restrained by Historically Successful
Behavioral Remedies
The circuit court was correct in noting that behavioral remedies, 145 such as
irrevocable arbitration agreements and long-term contracts, would likely restrain
Turner Broadcasting’s bargaining leverage in affiliate negotiations because the
federal government has previously accepted conduct remedies as a means to curtail
anticompetitive action from mergers. 146 The Director of the FTC’s Bureau of
Competition, Bruce Hoffman, once stated that “in some cases [the FTC] believe[s]
that a behavioral or conduct remedy can prevent competitive harm while allowing
the benefits of integration.”147 Mr. Hoffman further noted that in four examples of
vertical mergers, behavioral remedies “succeeded in maintaining competition at
premerger levels,” suggesting that the FTC could structure remedies for vertical
mergers that would restrain anticompetitive behavior. 148
In the Comcast and NBCU merger, a merger in a similar industry, the government
supported behavioral remedies imposed on the merger by the FCC. 149 Specifically
for the Comcast-NBCU merger, a “baseball style” arbitration was embraced, which
allowed distributors to retain access to NBC content during arbitration, mitigating
concerns that the merger would withhold NBC programming to benefit Comcast’s
distribution subscriptions.150 In United States v. AT&T, Inc., Judge Rogers found that
the irrevocable offers for no-blackout arbitration agreements were so effective that
he was not swayed in favor of the government even when presented with a
previous FCC statement made by AT&T during the Comcast-NBCU merger, where
both AT&T and DirecTV stated that vertically integrated MVPDs are inclined to
charge higher licensing fees for programming.151
In this case, Time Warner was not forced by the government to follow behavioral
remedies but independently elected to extend the same “baseball style” arbitration
that the government had embraced in the Comcast-NBCU merger to its
distributors.152 Following the reasoning of this circuit court, Turner Broadcasting
competitors should not lose significant sales in the market for a certain amount of
time, nor can Turner Broadcasting foreclose rivals due to the long-term contract
and arbitration agreement conduct remedies, so the market would remain
competitive post-merger.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
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See supra Section I.C (defining behavioral remedies).
See supra text accompanying notes 107–108, 123.
Hoffman, supra note 34, at 8.
See id.
United States v. AT&T, Inc., 916 F.3d 1029, 1035 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
Ford, supra note 108, at 4.
AT&T, 916 F.3d at 1036, 1041–42.
Ford, supra note 108, at 2.
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Additionally, recall that the Supreme Court in Brown Shoe Co. held that the
nature and purpose of the arrangement, present and future, were factors to
consider when examining mergers for anticompetitive effects. 153 In Brown Shoe
Co., the acquirer was actively attempting to foreclose market competition by
forcing the acquired to carry only the acquirer’s products.154 However, the AT&T
and Time Warner merger was different. The purpose and nature of AT&T and Time
Warner’s arrangement was not to foreclose competitors from the market; the
merger was an attempt to vertically integrate two company’s complementary
assets, respond to industry dynamics, and solve limitations within each company’s
respective business model.155 For example, Time Warner lacked information about
its viewers and thus their preferences, while AT&T lacked control over the video
content it offered.156 By acquiring Time Warner, AT&T would get immediate access
to content and an extensive advertising inventory, and Time Warner would benefit
from AT&T’s consumer relationships and data capabilities.157
Notably, even if the nature or purpose of the merger was to foreclose industry
competition, the merged entity of AT&T and Time Warner would not be able to take
such anticompetitive actions for the present and foreseeable future because of its
conduct-prohibitive arbitration agreements and long-term contracts.
B. The AT&T and Time Warner Merger May Increase Long-Term Competition by
Preventing the Elimination of AT&T or Time Warner from the Market
The circuit court supported the merger, meaning that the court felt the merger
would not lessen competition, as is required to succeed in a Section 7 Clayton Act
action.158 The court focused heavily on the impact of the merger on lessening
industry competition, but only briefly noted that the industry was “changing and
experiencing increasing competition” with emerging content distribution
methods.159 The court noted that SVODs, such as Netflix and Hulu, were emerging
on the market.160 Such SVODs, which are also vertically integrated, have led cable

153.

Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 329, 333 (1962).
Id. at 334.
155. United States v. AT&T Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 161, 181–82 (D.D.C. 2018), aff’d 916 F.3d 1029, 1031–32
(D.C. Cir. 2019).
156. Id. at 182. Because Time Warner lacked such consumer and preference information, it would be
disadvantaged by SVODs, like Netflix, Hulu, and Amazon Prime, and web companies like Facebook and Google,
which specialized in catering programming and advertisements to consumers. Id.
157. Id.
158. United States v. AT&T, Inc., 916 F.3d 1029, 1031–32 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
159. Id. at 1046.
160. Id. at 1042.
154.
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customers to “‘cut[] the cord’ and terminat[e] MVPD service altogether,”
threatening the long term success of AT&T MVPDs, like DirecTV and U-verse.161
AT&T and Time Warner needed to adapt to stay competitive in the evolving
market.162 “AT&T needed the deal . . . to evolve into a modern media company that
could compete with companies such as Netflix, Amazon, Facebook, and Google.” 163
Without the merger, it remained an open question whether AT&T or Time Warner
could even exist with the threatening competition of Amazon and Netflix. 164 In
considering the simple nature of competition, if AT&T or Time Warner ceased to
exist, industry competition would naturally decrease from the elimination of one or
two market share players.165 As the United States Supreme Court held in Ford
Motor Co., Ford’s acquisition of Electric Autolite Co. was found to have violated
Section 7 because it would have lessened competition by eliminating one of two
remaining market players and reducing future de-concentration in the market.166
While the government focused on the potential anticompetitive effects of the AT&T
and Time Warner merger, a lack of a merger could have led to the outcomes found
in Ford Motor Co.167 If AT&T and Time Warner did not merge, one or both may have
been displaced from the market because of an inability to adapt to and compete in
the evolving market. This could have lessened competition and concentrated the
market across just a few key players, such as Hulu or Netflix, enabling future
monopolies.
In judging the lawfulness of a merger under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, the
court can consider a number of factors, including the market shares of the merging
parties.168 In 2019, Netflix led with 68% of the United States market share for
SVODs, followed by Amazon Prime Video at 10%, Hulu at 9%, CBS All Access at 5%,

161.

Id. at 1034.
Hadas Gold, How Netflix and Amazon Helped Save the AT&T-Time Warner Deal, CNN BUS. (Feb. 27, 2019,
4:40 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/02/27/business/netflix-amazon-streaming-att-doj/index.html.
163. Mike Snider, Expect These Netflix Rivals Thanks to the AT&T-Time Warner Merger, USA TODAY (June 18,
2018, 12:01 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2018/06/15/cord-cutters-can-expect-newchoices-wake-t-time-warner-merger/703850002/.
164. Hadas Gold & Brian Stelter, Judge Approves $85 Billion AT&T-Time Warner Deal, CNN BUS. (June 13,
2018, 8:11 AM), https://money.cnn.com/2018/06/12/media/att-time-warner-ruling/index.html; Cecilia Kang,
Time Warner C.E.O. Testifies That AT&T Merger is Needed to Battle Silicon Valley, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/18/business/time-warner-att-merger.html.
165. See Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 566 (1972) (holding that the acquisition of one
company’s assets by another company was anticompetitive when the acquisition left only one independent
player remaining in the replacement market).
166. 405 U.S. 562, 565–68 (1972).
167. See supra text accompanying notes 96–98.
168. 2 ANTITRUST LAWS & TRADE REGULATION § 30.03 (2d ed. 2020).
162.
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and others at 7%.169 WarnerMedia, the revamped Time Warner, launched its SVOD
service, HBO Max, in May 2020, to compete in the market already dominated by
Netflix.170 Like the Hammerhill Paper Co. case, the video programming and
distribution industry does not have impenetrable barriers to entry. 171 Competition
in the video programming and distribution industry has increased from new
industry entrants in the past few years, with entrants including Walt Disney
Company’s Disney+, Amazon.com Inc.’s Prime Video, and Comcast’s Peacock all
threatening the dominant Netflix share. 172 Neither AT&T nor Time Warner
individually had dominated the SVOD market, so their merger created a competitive
market player, rather than a market monopoly.
In addition to low barriers to entry, similar to the distribution methods of
Hammerhill, AT&T pre-merger did not solely sell Time Warner content to
customers, and Time Warner, via Turner Broadcasting, did not solely license
content to AT&T.173 The circuit court, relying on the corporate-wide profit
maximization theory, noted that post-merger, AT&T and Time Warner would not
solely do business with each other because that would hinder corporate profit
maximization by eliminating other distributors to license content to. 174 Combined
with the arbitration agreements and long-term contracts, the merged entity of
AT&T and Time Warner should not eliminate all other business partners from the
programming and distribution chain because doing so would hurt overall corporate
profit maximization.
The merged entity’s emergence in the market that it, AT&T, or Time Warner did
not already dominate, combined with the prevention of the elimination of either
AT&T or Time Warner from a market they individually were unable to adapt to,
serves to increase long-term market competition and de-concentrate the market.
C. Impact of the Decision
The United States v. AT&T, Inc. decision ultimately impacted the merged entity’s
prices, paved the way for additional vertical mergers, and highlighted the need for
new vertical merger guidelines. Section IV.C.1 describes the resulting consumer
169. Dade Hayes, Netflix has 71% of Global SVOD Market, But New Services Gain Grounds—Report, DEADLINE
(Apr. 1, 2019, 1:51 PM), https://deadline.com/2019/04/netflix-has-71-of-global-svod-market-but-newservices-gain-ground-report-1202586356/.
170. Kif Leswing, HBO Max Online Service Just Launched in the U.S — Here’s a First Look, CNBC (May 27,
2020,
9:00
AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/27/hbo-max-new-hbo-streaming-video-servicelaunches.html.
171. The circuit court noted the rising presence of virtual MVPDs and SVODs, like Netflix and Hulu. United
States v. AT&T, Inc., 916 F.3d 1029, 1042 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
172. Joe Flint, Netflix Raises Prices as Competition Increases, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 29, 2020, 4:31 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/netflix-raises-price-of-standard-premium-plans-11604000757.
173. AT&T, 916 F.3d at 1044.
174. Id.
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price increase.175 Section IV.C.2 identifies a number of vertical mergers following
the United States v. AT&T, Inc. decision.176 Section IV.C.3 introduces the new
vertical merger guidelines that were released in 2020. 177 Finally, Section IV.C.4
highlights ongoing Big Tech antitrust litigation and considers how the United States
v. AT&T, Inc. decision may affect the lawsuits.178
The Merger Created Price Increases for Customers Despite Proponents of the
Merger Testifying That There Would Not be Price Increases
Both the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ruled in favor of AT&T, finding
that evidence did not indicate that the merger would cause price increases for
consumers.179 At trial, Time Warner and AT&T witnesses testified that the merger
would actually lower the price of video distributions to consumers. 180 The circuit
court agreed with the district court that the evidence indicated that the merger
“would [not] lead to ‘any raised costs’ for rival distributors or consumers.’”181
Despite these findings, following the district court’s decision, AT&T immediately
raised the base price of its DirecTV Now streaming service for new customers and
certain existing customers.182 By December 2019, DirecTV prices increased
between 11% and 25%, depending on the offerings and contract longevity. 183 On
November 19, 2020, AT&T announced another round of price increases for DirecTV
Satellite and U-verse TV services.184 AT&T attributed its latest round of price
increases to “increased programming costs,” stating, “[p]eriodically, TV network

175.

See infra Section IV.C.1.
See infra Section IV.C.2.
177. See infra Section IV.C.3. The new 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines were withdrawn in September 2021,
but the FTC plans to work with the DOJ to update the vertical merger guidance. Federal Trade Commission
Withdraws Vertical Merger Guidelines and Commentary, FTC (Sept. 15, 2021), https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/press-releases/2021/09/federal-trade-commission-withdraws-vertical-merger-guidelines.
178. See infra Section IV.C.4.
179. Id. at 1038, 1046.
180. Testifying witnesses stated that the merger would create new advertising opportunities, which would
increase advertising revenues, “alleviat[ing] pressure on the programming side and lower[ing] the price of video
distribution to consumers.” United States v. AT&T Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 161, 183 (D.D.C. 2018), aff’d 916 F.3d
1029, 1031–32 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
181. AT&T, 916 F.3d at 1038, 1046.
182. Jon Brodkin, AT&T Promised Lower Prices After Time Warner Merger—it’s Raising Them Instead, ARS
TECHNICA (July 2, 2018, 4:22 PM), https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2018/07/att-promisedlower-prices-after-time-warner-merger-its-raising-them-instead/. Because the price increase occurred after
the district court’s decision, even on appeal at the circuit court, the government could not introduce the price
increase as new evidence. FED. R. APP. P. 10(a); see also Jeffrey C. Dobbins, New Evidence on Appeal, 96 MINN. L.
REV. 2016 (2012).
183. Josh Kosman, DirecTV Monthly Rates Spike After AT&T’s Time Warner Buy, N.Y. POST (Dec. 15, 2019,
10:51 PM), https://nypost.com/2019/12/15/directv-monthly-rates-spike-after-atts-time-warner-buy/.
184. Brodkin, supra note 182.
176.
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owners increase the fees they charge DirecTV for the right to broadcast their
movies, shows, and sporting events.”185 AT&T should not pass off all of the blame
onto other network owners for the price increase. AT&T itself is a television
network owner, as it owns Time Warner, so AT&T also can determine certain
programming prices.
It is more plausible that the latest price increase is to recover lost revenue from
AT&T’s dramatically declining customer base.186 The district court found that the
merger would increase AT&T’s profits by reducing marginal costs, and with
increased profits, AT&T would have the “incentive to get more customers” and “the
DirecTV price [would] go down to consumers.” 187 In early 2017, AT&T had over 25
million Premium TV customers, but as of December 2020, that number had dropped
to 17.1 million.188 Even if marginal costs were reduced by the merger, AT&T is not
getting the additional customers it needs to lower DirecTV prices for consumers.
Without the additional customers, prices will likely continue to increase to generate
profits, pushing away even more customers.
The AT&T and Time Warner Merger Paved the Way for Additional Vertical
Mergers
Since the AT&T and Time Warner merger was approved, the number of vertical
mergers has been increasing.189 On January 28, 2019, the FTC allowed a vertical
merger between Staples, Inc. (“Staples”) and Essendant, Inc. (“Essendant”). 190 For
this merger, the FTC accepted a settlement that required post-merger, behavioral
remedies be enforced to limit the access Staples could gain to commercially
sensitive business information of Essendant customers to raise its prices. 191 Two
FTC Commissioners voted against the settlement and expressed concerns that this
merger created a monopsony power by (1) Staples obtaining the ability to raise the
price of Essendant products sold to other dealers who compete with Staples and (2)
giving the merged entity increased market power on the buy side. 192 However, the
185.

Id.
Id.
187. United States v. AT&T Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 161, 198 (D.D.C. 2018), aff’d 916 F.3d 1029, 1031–32 (D.C.
Cir. 2019).
188. Brodkin, supra note 182.
189. Additional vertical mergers that occurred after the AT&T and Time Warner district court decision
included the Cigna-Express Scripts merger and the CVS-Aetna merger. Armie Margaret Lee, AT&T-Time Warner
Ruling a Positive for Cigna-Express Scripts, CVS-Aetna Deals, STREET (June 13, 2018, 10:24 AM),
https://www.thestreet.com/markets/att-time-warner-ruling-positive-for-cigna-express-scripts-14620092.
190. Daniel E. Hemli & Jacqueline R. Java, FTC Decision Highlights Growing Divide on Vertical Mergers, NAT.
L. REV. (Feb. 1, 2019), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/ftc-decision-highlights-growing-divide-verticalmergers.
191. The settlement also required that a monitor be appointed for ten years to oversee the activity of
Staples and Essendant. Id.
192. Then-FTC Commissioner Rohit Chopra, who voted against the merger, stressed the importance of
considering the buyer’s incentives and previous track record, noting that Sycamore, Staples’ owner, had once
186.
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majority who approved the deal noted that if Essendant prices were raised for
dealers, many of those dealers would cease doing business with Essendant and
would switch to doing business with Essendant’s largest wholesale competitor. 193
This theory is plausible using the AT&T and Time Warner post-merger price
increases as a proxy.194 Post-merger, when AT&T prices increased, the customer
base dropped; presumably, consumers switched to lower-cost competitors.195 In
Essendant’s case, dealers will likely act as AT&T customers did, and switch to a
lower-cost alternative rather than be subjected to price increases.
Additionally, in February 2020, a federal judge approved a merger between TMobile and Sprint.196 Prior to this merger reaching the court, the FCC and
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) approved the deal, which included structural and
behavioral remedies.197 However, several state Attorney Generals then sued to
block it and protect their State’s consumers.198 Specifically, Brian E. Frosh,
Maryland’s Attorney General, joined nine other states in filing a lawsuit to halt the
merger of these two telecom giants, alleging the merger would lessen competition
and increase prices for cellphone services. 199 Frosh noted the dangers of merging
two of the United States’ largest cellphone carriers, and that “[r]educed
competition in a market that only has four major competitors right now [would]
result in higher prices and fewer options for Marylanders.” 200 Similar to the
outcome of United States v. AT&T, Inc., Southern District of New York Judge Victor
Marrero ultimately concluded that that the evidence did not indicate that the
proposed merger of Sprint and T-Mobile would increase prices and “substantially
lessen competition” in the market, thereby greenlighting the merger. 201
It is possible that vertical mergers have been increasing following the AT&T and
Time Warner merger because courts are becoming more comfortable in applying
acquired an asset and quickly resold it, indicative of the fact that Sycamore and thus Staples would be more
concerned with increasing margins quickly rather than investing capital to grow Essendant’s business. Id.
193. Id.
194. See supra Section IV.C.1.
195. See supra text accompanying notes 183–184, 188 (detailing the DirecTV price increase and
corresponding customer base decline).
196. Makena Kelly, T-Mobile and Sprint Win Lawsuit and Will be Allowed to Merge, VERGE (Feb. 11, 2020,
8:30 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2020/2/11/21132924/tmobile-sprint-merger-approved-federal-courtantitrust-lawsuit.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Press Release, Brian E. Frosh, Md. Off. Att’y Gen., Att’y Gen. Frosh Joins Suit to Block T-Mobile and
Sprint Megamerger (June 11, 2019) (on file with author).
200. An investigation led by the Attorneys General found the claimed benefits of the merger were generally
unverifiable and would only be delivered years into the future, whereas if the merger happened, the combined
entity could immediately raise prices and cut quality, meaning benefits from the merger would be outweighed
by the immediate harm to competition and consumers. Id.
201. New York v. Deutsche Telekom AG, 439 F. Supp. 3d 179, 189 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).
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remedies to constrain certain anticompetitive actions.202 If there were not
structural or behavioral remedies to impose, the court’s other option would be to
prevent the merger from occurring at all.203
D. The AT&T and Time Warner Merger Demonstrated the Need for New Vertical
Merger Guidelines
For the first time since 1984, on June 30, 2020, the FTC and DOJ jointly released
new antitrust guidelines for evaluating vertical mergers. 204 When the district court
decided the AT&T merger case in 2018, it was clear that the 1984 Guidelines were
outdated and did not reflect modern agency policy. 205 Antitrust commentators,
prior to the release of the 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines, often commented on
how undeveloped vertical merger enforcement law had been for the past forty
years.206 For example, the Supreme Court last analyzed a vertical merger case
brought by the FTC in 1979, 207 and between 1994 and 2016, only 52 mergers
involving vertical integrations were challenged by U.S. agencies. 208 Irrespective of
how outdated the 1984 Guidelines were, the district court judge, Judge Leon,
repeatedly cited the 1984 version in his holding in favor of the merger. 209
The 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines, which describe how agencies analyze
vertical mergers, were intended “to assist the business community and antitrust
practitioners by increasing the transparency” of the vertical merger analytical
process.210 Importantly, the 2020 Guidelines were also updated to “assist the courts
in developing an appropriate framework for interpreting and applying the antitrust
202. See supra Section IV.A (describing the remedies imposed on the AT&T and Time Warner and Comcast
and NBCU mergers).
203. See supra text accompanying note 43.
204. FTC and DOJ Issue Antitrust Guidelines for Evaluating Vertical Mergers, FED. TRADE COMM’N. (June 30,
2020),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2020/06/ftc-doj-issue-antitrust-guidelinesevaluating-vertical-mergers.
205. Jonathan M. Jacobson, Vertical Mergers: Is it Time to Move the Ball?, FED. TRADE COMM’N, Summer 2019,
at 10.
206. Steve C. Salop, Invigorating Vertical Merger Enforcement, 127 YALE L.J. 1962, 1964 (2018). Herbert
Hovenkamp, an antitrust expert, stated that “during the 1980s there was a ‘general hostility’ towards vertical
antitrust activity of all kinds and the government ‘lost interest.’” Is the AT&T-Time Warner Decision a Blow
Against
Antitrust,
KNOWLEDGE
AT
WHARTON
(June
19,
2018),
https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/impact-att-time-warner-decision/.
207. Salop, supra note 206, at 1964 (citing Fruehauf Corp. v. F.T.C., 603 F.2d 345, 353, 355 (2d Cir. 1979)
(holding that because a showing of some probable anticompetitive impacts from a merger was necessary to
enjoin a merger, a Section 7 violation based on effects of a merger must be set aside if unsupported by
substantial evidence)).
208. Id.
209. United States v. AT&T Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 161, 192–94 (D.D.C. 2018), aff’d 916 F.3d 1029, 1031–32
(D.C. Cir. 2019).
210. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM’N, VERTICAL MERGER GUIDELINES 1 (2020).
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laws to the types of transactions discussed [in the guidelines].”211 It is plausible that
the 2020 update to the Vertical Merger Guidelines was a response to the
government’s failed challenge to the AT&T and Time Warner merger, which was the
first litigated challenge to a vertical transaction in almost 40 years. 212
Despite this progress in releasing new guidelines, in September 2021 the FTC
withdrew its approval of the 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines and Commentary. 213
These guidance documents were found by the FTC to include “unsound economic
theories that [were] unsupported by the law or market realities.” 214 The FTC noted
that the approval was withdrawn to “prevent industry or judicial reliance on a
flawed approach.”215 The Guidelines still remain in effect at the DOJ, meaning that
the DOJ and FTC may evaluate vertical mergers differently. 216 However, the FTC has
indicated that they will continue to work with the DOJ to update vertical merger
guidance.217
If the DOJ remains a contributor to Vertical Merger Guidelines, and the courts
rely on such guidelines to analyze mergers that are challenged by the DOJ, courts
should more often than not rule in favor of the DOJ, so long as the DOJ’s claims are
legitimate. For vertical merger cases that reach the court, the DOJ or another
federal agency are often the party claiming an antitrust law violation. 218 The DOJ
may be fighting against corporate monopolies, but by being both the enforcer of
antitrust violations and the creator of the guidelines a court will use to analyze
antitrust concerns, the DOJ has become a controlling decision maker in the judicial
process and is better positioned to ensure it will not lose again when challenging a
merger.
E. Big Tech Versus Antitrust Laws
Antitrust law has been in the public eye in the past year following allegations
that some of the world’s largest technology companies have “exercised and abused
211.

Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
Mark McCareins, AT&T-Time Warner Ruling a Milestone for Vertical Mergers, HILL (June 14, 2018, 7:30
AM), https://thehill.com/opinion/finance/392158-att-time-warner-ruling-a-watershed-moment-for-verticalmergers.
213. Federal Trade Commission Withdraws Vertical Merger Guidelines and Commentary, FTC (Sept. 15,
2021),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2021/09/federal-trade-commission-withdrawsvertical-merger-guidelines.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Joel Mitnick & Ngoc Pham Hulbig, FTC Rescinds Vertical Merger Guidelines, NAT’L L. REV. (Sept. 21, 2021),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/ftc-rescinds-vertical-merger-guidelines.
217. Federal Trade Commission Withdraws Vertical Merger Guidelines and Commentary, FTC (Sept. 15,
2021),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2021/09/federal-trade-commission-withdrawsvertical-merger-guidelines.
218. MERGER REMEDIES MANUAL, supra note 40.
212.
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their monopoly power.”219 House lawmakers investigated Amazon, Apple,
Facebook, and Google over a 16-month period from 2019 to 2020, concluding that
“the companies had abused their dominant positions, setting and often dictating
prices and rules for commerce, search, advertising, social networking and
publishing.”220
On October 20, 2020, Google was sued by the Department of Justice and eleven
Attorneys General under the Sherman Act 221 for “unlawfully maintaining
monopolies in the markets for general search services, search advertising, and
general search text advertising in the United States through anticompetitive and
exclusionary practices.”222 The complaint alleged that Google entered into
exclusionary agreements and engaged in anticompetitive conduct to “lock up
distribution channels and block rivals.”223 Specifically, Google was charged with
paying billions of dollars annually to distributors to prohibit Google’s distributors
from dealing with Google’s competitors.224 Among other complaints, these
payments were alleged to also raise barriers to entry for rivals, especially for small
search companies that could not afford to pay the billion dollar entry fee. 225
Google’s situation differs from the AT&T and Time Warner merger. First, there
were lower barriers to entry in the video programming and distribution industry,226
which worked in favor of the AT&T and Time Warner merger. On the other hand,

219. Cecilia Kang & David McCabe, House Lawmakers Condemn Big Tech’s ‘Monopoly Power’ and Urge Their
Breakups, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/06/technology/congress-big-techmonopoly-power.html.
220. Id. On May 25, 2021, the District of Columbia Attorney General sued Amazon for violations of the
District of Columbia Antitrust Act, alleging Amazon suppressed competition on other online retail sales
platforms by implementing anticompetitive restraints on its third-party sellers, thereby raising the prices of
goods to consumers in the online retail sales market. Complaint at 1–2, District of Columbia v. Amazon.com,
Inc., No. 2021 CA 001775 B (D.C. Super. Ct. May 25, 2021). As Hovenkamp notes, this lawsuit was filed in the
D.C. Superior Court under D.C. antitrust laws, rather than under federal antitrust laws, limiting the scope of any
resulting judgment to D.C. Cat Zakrzewski & Rachel Lerman, D.C. Attorney General Brings Antitrust Lawsuit
Against Amazon, WASH. POST (May 25, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/05/25/dcag-antitrust/.
221. See supra note 69 (introducing the Sherman Act).
222. Complaint at 2, United States v. Google LLC, No. 1:20-cv-03010 (D.D.C. Oct. 20, 2020). On December
17, 2020, Google was sued by a coalition of 38 states and territories for violating antitrust law by holding a
general search monopoly. Richard Nieva, Google Hit by Antitrust Lawsuit from Nearly 40 States Over Alleged
Search Monopoly, CNET (Dec. 17, 2020, 2:31 PM), https://www.cnet.com/news/google-hit-by-antitrustlawsuit-from-nearly-40-states-over-alleged-search-monopoly/. The DOJ and state lawsuits were consolidated
in January 2021. Amended Complaint, United States v. Google LLC, No. 1:20-cv-03010 (D.D.C. Jan. 15, 2021).
223. Complaint, supra note 222, at 3.
224. Id. at 3–4. Distributors are disincentivized to switch from Google to a Google competitor, even with
restraints on distributor behaviors by Google because Google shares valuable advertising monopoly revenue
with the distributors in return for the commitment to favor Google’s search engine. Id. at 5.
225. Id. at 5.
226. See supra notes 171–172 and accompanying text.
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Google’s stronghold in the search engine market has created a billion dollar plus
barrier to entry, which is greatly restrictive and thus anticompetitive.227
Additionally, the circuit court held for the merger of AT&T and Time Warner
because it noted that AT&T and Time Warner would not solely do business with
each other after the merger because that would hinder corporate profit
maximization.228 Regarding the Google lawsuit and using United States v. AT&T, Inc.
as the governing law, the court may be inclined to find that Google is engaging in
anticompetitive conduct because, unlike AT&T and Time Warner, Google is shutting
off distribution channels for competitors by demanding distributors only partner
with Google.229 Additionally, in further applying the holding of United States v.
AT&T, Inc., the Google court could find that Google has violated antitrust laws by
its search business monopoly. The court may seek to cure Google’s anticompetitive
behavior in the present and future by imposing restrictive conduct remedies on the
tech giant.230 This case is ongoing, and a tentative trial start date has been set for
2023.231
Following the Google lawsuit, on December 9, 2020, the Federal Trade
Commission and 46 states232 sued Facebook, Inc. (“Facebook”) for anticompetitive
conduct and unfair methods of competition in violation of Section 5(a) of the
Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTC Act”).233 The complaint alleged that Facebook
bought companies Instagram and WhatsApp to eliminate threats to Facebook’s
dominant position.234 Additionally, the complaint accused Facebook of enforcing
anticompetitive conditions on access to its “valuable” platform interconnections.235
Anticompetitive conditions included making application programming interfaces
(“APIs”) available to third-party apps only if third-parties refrained from providing
the same core functions offered by Facebook and refrained from connecting with

227.

Complaint, supra note 222, at 5.
See supra text accompanying notes 173–174.
229. Complaint, supra note 222, at 6.
230. See supra Section IV.A.
231. Lauren Feiner, DOJ Case Against Google Likely Won’t Go To Trial Until Late 2023, Judge Says, CNBC
(Dec. 18, 2020, 5:48 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/12/18/doj-case-against-google-likely-wont-go-to-trialuntil-late-2023-judge-says.html.
232. Maryland’s Attorney General Brian E. Frosh joined the other state Attorneys General in suing Facebook
and stated that the lawsuit would “bring the market back into balance, allow other businesses to compete, and
will protect the privacy of millions of users.” Mark Fowser, Del., Md. Join Facebook Anti-Trust Lawsuit, WGMD
(Dec. 10, 2020), https://www.wgmd.com/del-md-join-facebook-anti-trust-lawsuit/.
233. Complaint for Injunctive and Other Equitable Relief at 1, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Facebook, Inc., No.
1:20-cv-03590 (D.D.C. Dec. 9, 2020); 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (“Unfair methods of competition in or affecting
commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are hereby declared unlawful.”).
234. Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg wrote in a 2008 email “it is better to buy than compete.” Complaint
for Injunctive and Other Equitable Relief, supra note 233, at 2.
235. Id. at 7.
228.
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or promoting other social networks.236 Such conduct was alleged to harm
competition in multiple ways, including preventing third-party apps from (1)
working in certain ways with firms that compete with Facebook and (2) evolving
into competitors that could one day threaten Facebook’s “personal social
networking” monopoly.237
On June 29, 2021, federal Judge James Boasberg dismissed the Facebook lawsuit
filed by the FTC and the states.238 The Judge stated that the FTC’s lawsuit was
“legally insufficient” as it did not plead enough allegations to support the claim of
monopolization.239 On August 19, 2021, the FTC filed an amended complaint, again
alleging anticompetitive conduct and unfair methods of competition by Facebook
in violation of Section 5(a) of the FTC Act.240 The anticompetitive conduct
allegations are similar: first, that Facebook has a strategy to “buy or bury”
threatening innovators to suppress competition, including acquiring and controlling
Instagram and WhatsApp; and second, that Facebook requires conditional dealing
policies in its agreements with firms that interoperate with its platform to limit
third-party apps’ abilities to engage with Facebook rivals or even become Facebook
rivals themselves.241
Using United States v. AT&T, Inc. as the governing law, the Facebook court may
be inclined to rule against Facebook. First, there are significant barriers to entry in
the social networking market, including direct network effects and high switching
costs.242 A key reason the AT&T and Time Warner merger, as well as the Hammerhill
merger, were allowed, was that there were not high barriers to entry in the
industry.243 On the other hand, a high barrier to entry, evidenced in Ford Motor Co.,

236.

Id. at 7–8.
Id. at 8.
238. Brett Kendall, Government Antitrust Lawsuits Against Facebook Thrown Out by Federal Judge, WALL ST.
J. (June 29, 2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/federal-judge-dismisses-government-antitrust-lawsuitsagainst-facebook-11624907747.
239. Id.
240. First Amended Complaint for Injunctive and Other Equitable Relief at 1, Fed. Trade Comm’n v.
Facebook, Inc., No. 1:20-cv-03590-JEB (D.D.C. Aug. 19, 2021).
241. Id. at 25–26, 43.
242. Direct network effects “refer to user-to-user effects that make a personal social network more valuable
as more users join the service.” First Amended Complaint for Injunctive and Other Equitable Relief, supra note
240, at 70.
243. United States v. Hammerhill Paper Co., 429 F. Supp. 1271, 1285–86, 1293 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (finding the
vertical merger to be lawful because industry barriers to entry were historically so low that if the merged entity
attempted to foreclose competitors from distribution access, the foreclosed could just establish a new firm);
United States v. AT&T, Inc., 916 F.3d 1029, 1042 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (noting that barriers to entry in the video
programming and distribution industry were penetrable, meaning the merger of AT&T and Time Warner would
not completely foreclose industry entrants).
237.
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was held to be anticompetitive. 244 Additionally, the conditions Facebook imposed
on third-party apps had the potential to prevent these third-parties from working
with other firms; this anticompetitive conduct differed from the predicted
competitive conduct of AT&T and Time Warner where the judge found that AT&T
would elect to do business with distributors in addition to Time Warner post-merger
to maximize profit.245 Lastly, AT&T and Time Warner sought to merge to benefit
from each other’s offerings, prevent individual dissolution, and engage in operating
synergies.246 On the other hand, Facebook acquired Instagram and WhatsApp
solely to prevent market competition.247 Similar to the predicted outcome of the
Google lawsuit, applying the holding of United States v. AT&T, Inc., the court could
find that Facebook has violated antitrust laws by solely acting to suppress
competition. While this lawsuit is ongoing, in October 2021 Facebook filed another
motion to dismiss the FTC’s lawsuit.248
V. Conclusion

In United States v. AT&T, Inc., the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit addressed whether the proposed merger between AT&T and
Time Warner violated Section 7 of the Clayton Act. 249 Ultimately, the D.C. Circuit
Court held that the merger did not have anticompetitive effects because the merger
did not increase the merged entity’s bargaining power, so the court denied a
permanent injunction for the merger. 250 The court correctly found that the merger
would not substantially impact industry competition because behavioral remedies
imposed on the merger would curtail increased leverage against distributors and
remedy a tendency towards anticompetitive arrangements.251 The merger also has
the potential to increase competition in the market by preventing the elimination
of AT&T or Time Warner from an evolving market that the pre-merged companies
struggled to stay relevant in.252

244. Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 566–68 (1972) (holding that the acquisition of one
company’s assets by another company was anticompetitive because it raised barriers to entry in the market by
leaving only one independent player remaining in the replacement market).
245. AT&T, 916 F.3d at 1044.
246. United States v. AT&T Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 161, 181–82 (D.D.C. 2018), aff’d 916 F.3d 1029, 1031–32
(D.C. Cir. 2019).
247. First Amended Complaint for Injunctive and Other Equitable Relief, supra note 240, at 76–78.
248. Lauren Feiner, Facebook Files Motion to Dismiss FTC Lawsuit Again, Says Chair Khan Should Have
Recused Herself, CNBC (Oct. 4, 2021, 2:35 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2021/10/04/facebook-files-to-dismissftc-lawsuit-again-says-khan-should-have-recused.html.
249. AT&T, 916 F.3d at 1031–32.
250. Id. at 1047.
251. See supra Section IV.A.
252. See supra Section IV.B.
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In just a few years following the district and circuit courts’ decisions, the merger
has negatively impacted customers, forged an increase in vertical mergers, and led
the government to attempt to regain control over the process by enacting new
vertical merger guidelines.253 With the lawsuits recently filed by U.S. agencies
against Google and Facebook for violating antitrust laws 254 and further inquiries
into the market powers of Amazon and Apple, potential changes and challenges to
current antitrust law are on the horizon.255

253.

See supra Section IV.C.
Anat Alon-Beck & Nizan Geslevich Packin, Antitrust is Back: A Q&A with the Experts, FORBES (Dec. 14,
2020, 1:18 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/anatalonbeck/2020/12/14/antitrust-is-back-a-qa-with-theexperts/?sh=1dffa072216d.
255. Ryan Tracy, House Panel Says Big Tech Wields Monopoly Power, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 6, 2020, 8:07 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/house-panel-calls-for-congress-to-break-up-tech-giants-11602016985.
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